I Working Papers della Collana dei Quaderni del Dipartimento di Ingegneria Gestionale costituiscono un servizio atto a fornire la tempestiva divulgazione dei risultati dell'attività di ricerca, siano essi in forma provvisoria o definitiva.
Introduction
Underwriters underprice IPOs and often, immediately after, repurchase shares in an attempt to stabilize the price. The theoretical explanations proposed by the literature for this phenomenon are very diverse. For instance, the option to stabilize can be interpreted as a put option offered to informed (institutional) investors as a reward for revealing information before the IPO (Benveniste, et al., 1996) , or as a put option to recompense uninformed investors for the "winner's curse," in the spirit of Rock (1986) model (Chowdhry and Nanda, 1996) . Despite several attempts (e.g. Wilhelm, 1999; Chen and Wilhelm, 2008; Zhang, 2004) , the underwriters' conduct after the issue, when price stabilization is provided, remains opaque (Aggarwal, 2000) .
The empirical studies on the price stabilization activity, however, are relatively few (Ruud, 1993; Hanley, et al., 1993; Schultz and Zaman, 1994; Benveniste, et al., 1998) perhaps because of the difficulties in accessing data. One obstacle with testing is that underwriters do not formally commit to price support, nor do they publicly disclose stabilizing activities. Underwriters do not explicitly commit to price support but, instead, decide ex post whether, and how much, to stabilize. Perhaps, a legally binding contract could be too costly to define (under what conditions the underwriter provides price support? how many shares and at what prices?) and to enforce (Lewellen, 2006) .
However, since trading activity may be profitable for underwriters, they may be motivated to intervene also when not needed. Viceversa, they may be reluctant to stabilize the price of IPOs when it is costly. Ellis et al. (2000) demonstrate that underwriters take substantial inventory positions when stabilizing stock price. The provision of price stabilization may therefore be subject to opportunistic behaviors from the underwriters, as it is an intrinsically profitable activity.
In this paper, we question whether the price stabilization activity is carried out by underwriters when actually needed. To this end, we employ Heckman and Tobit models to investigate the determinants of the underwriter's decision to grant price stabilization.
The empirical setting of our paper is Italy, where we can access unique data provided by the stock exchange (Borsa Italiana), that enable us to identify the IPOs that were stabilized. We find that only half of the IPOs that require this service are actually stabilized after going public, that price support is substantial for poorly performing IPOs, and that underwriter's reputation is negatively associated with the stabilization activity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the research design and methodologies. Results are summarized in Section 3, and Section 4 concludes the article.
Research design

Institutional setting
This paper focuses on the IPO market in Italy, for which we have data on the entire population of IPOs in the period [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] † . Investigating the Italian underwriting market may be instructive, as its institutional setting is similar to most continental European countries, but significantly different from the US market (Abrahamson, et al., 2011) . In Europe, the price stabilization activity is never mandatory, can be done in the first month of trading and cannot be done above the offering price, as regulated by the 
Methodology and variables
In this paper, we investigate the determinants of the underwriter's decision to stabilize the price and the factors influencing its intensity. Since the intensity of the price stabilization activity is observable only when the underwriter decides to intervene, we correct for ‡ Overallotment occurs when the underwriter sells more shares than the issuer made available, by borrowing them from pre-IPO shareholders. The balance can be covered by giving back the corresponding amount of money (greenshoe) and/or shares (stabilization) to the lenders. In the first case, the underwriter can exercise the greenshoe option up to 30 days after the listing, and pay for shares at the offer price independently from the current market valuation. In the second case, the underwriter buys shares from the aftermarket and gives them back to the lenders. A naked short position occurs when overallotment is greater than 15% of the offer volume. The presence of a naked short position implies stabilization, since the greenshoe option is limited to 15% of offer volume. The greenshoe option and stabilization are not mutually exclusive. The choice of which strategy to adopt is determined by the aftermarket stock price: if it rises, buying shares would be more costly than exercising the greenshoe. Hence, stabilization is typically associated with poorly performing IPOs and is aimed at preventing price drops. § Stabilization data are disclosed in a report transmitted to Borsa Italiana by the underwriter at the end of the first trading month.
selection bias by employing a two-step Heckman procedure. In the first step, the dependent variable is a dummy related to the underwriter's decision. Price performance during the first month is the driver for the provision of this service, but it is in turn influenced by stabilization activity, hence endogenous. Therefore, we adopt an instrumental variable approach by employing the following instruments ** for the 1-month buy-and-hold abnormal return: pre-IPO market return, i.e. the return of the FTSE Italia MIB Index over 100 days prior the IPO; market momentum, i.e. the number of IPOs in
Italy in the 12 months before listing; underpricing, i.e. the difference between the 1st day closing price and the offer price, in percentage of offer price; and claw back clauses to retail investors, † † i.e. the fraction of shares shifted from institutional to retail investors, as percentage of the offer volume.
We consider variables in three categories: (1) firm and offer characteristics; (2) underwriter characteristics; (3) the options of the underwriters. ‡ ‡
In the first group, we employ firm age at the IPO as a proxy for maturity, while size controls for economies of scale. We also include relative issue size, dilution ratio, and institutional allocation. To control for market conditions, we add the return of the FTSE Italia MIB index 100 days before the listing date (pre-IPO market return), and the number of IPOs in the previous twelve months (market momentum). Finally, we include price revision, claw-back clauses, and underpricing to control for the characteristics of the ** Endogeneity of the 1-month BHAR is verified through Hausman (Hausman, J. A., 1978 offer. Pre-IPO market return, institutional allocation, price revision and underpricing are proxies for performance § § , while other variables such as firm size and offer characteristics are expected to influence the intensity of the stabilization.
The second set of determinants is related to the underwriter. First, we include a dummy to indicate when non-Italian banks are involved in the process. The underwriter's reputation is proxied by its market share (proceeds) in the Italian market. *** The size of the underwriting syndicate is also included, because large syndicates allow to share the IPO risk (Torstila, 2001 ). We include the underwriter' the gross spread (how much underwriters are paid for taking the company public) to see whether fess have any predictive power regarding the price stabilization activity. † † †
The third group includes variables measuring the options of the underwriters: the greenshoe, the overallotment, and the naked short option. For each option, dummies are used on the first regression to test the decision to stabilize, while the volume is used in the second regression on stabilization intensity.
Results
We examine the underwriters' conduct in providing price stabilization and liquidity support. Figure 1 offers a clear picture of how underwriters cover the initial short position, undertaken in 62.6% of the IPOs. The graph refers to the end of the first month of trading, and shows the average fraction covered by exercising the greenshoe option, § § We checked the validity of these variables by testing relevance (correlation with the endogenous explanatory variable) and exogeneity (no correlation with the error terms). *** We also defined underwriter reputation with reference to the number of IPOs managed instead of capital raised, finding similar results. These models are not reported in this paper. † † † As reported in Table 1 , the median gross spread in Italy is 4%, lower than the tradition 'seven percent solution of US, but in line with previous studies in Europe (Chen, [FIGURE 1]
The largest fraction of short position is covered using the greenshoe option, which is exercised at a nearly constant rate, regardless of price trends. This is not particularly surprising, as underwriters have the incentive to exercise the greenshoe even for offerings that trade below the offer price, because they earn fees in percentage of all the shares issued. Price stabilization is more intense in bad performing offerings, confirming that aftermarket performance drives its provision. However, some stabilization activity occurs even when the stock price keeps persistently higher than the offer price. Stabilizing well performing offerings is costly for underwriters, and raises some questions about their behavior in the provision of aftermarket services.
Therefore, we try to unveil the determinants of the stabilization decision using a Heckman selection model. We include overallotment, naked short, and greenshoe dummies to control for short covering (i.e., 'non discretional' stabilization). The results of this model are shown in Table 1 .
[ This result is in contrast with the findings of Lewellen (2006) that examines IPOs on the Nasdaq from 1996 yo 1999, finding a strong positive association between price support and underwriter size. Lewellen (2006) argues that underwriter reputation could be positively associated with stabilization activity ("reputation hypothesis") for two reasons.
First, while overpricing may hurt the underwriter's reputation, the following price support can be viewed as an ex post action to repair the damage. Second, since stabilization is a discretionary activity, rather than a legally binding commitment, an higher reputation should increase the probability of this commitment to be honored. By contrast, our result is, in practice, an evidence of a "reversed reputation hypothesis" on the Italian market.
The negative association between reputation and stabilization activity may be explained by the matching between issuer and underwriter (Fang, 2005) : prestigious banks have stricter standards, so take public only high-quality firms which are less likely to underperform and are therefore less likely to need price support.
Conversely, the entity of the gross spread does not predict the decision to stabilize the price. Surprisingly, the overallotment, greenshoe option, and naked short dummies are not significant, even though all three should be crucial in the stabilization decision (short covering). These results point out that underwriters still act with a certain degree of discretion. The second column documents that neither offer size nor the extent of the short position (overallotment and naked short) are influential on the intensity of stabilization. Instead, the negative coefficient of the exercised greenshoe option confirms its substitutability for price stabilization. The nationality and reputation of the underwriter are also crucial in the stabilization decision: foreign and highly ranked banks act less promptly to support stock prices, probably because they take public only high-quality firms that are less likely to underperform. This results provide insights on why only half of the IPOs in Italy actually receive price stabilization. After controlling for all determinants that can discriminate offers expected to be riskier, the underwriter's reputation has a significant impact on the likelihood for an IPO to receive price stabilization. In practice, our results support the idea that underwriters with a better reputation are better in identifying, through unobservable characteristics, those issues that will not need any stabilization activity.
Conclusions
While a rich previous literature documents how underwriter reputation may signal the best IPOs (in terms of underpricing, post-IPO performance, etc.), to the best of our knowledge our paper is the first to provide evidence that underwriters with a better reputation identify offers that will receive less price stabilization.
Nevertheless, our result is in contrast with the findings of Lewellen (2006) , that finds a positive association between underwriter reputation and price support on the Nasdaq, between 1996 and 1999. Why underwriter's reputation has a different relationship with price stabilization on different markets is still a puzzle, and calls for future comparative research. (Lee, et al., 1996) Relative issue size Number of shares offered over pre-IPO outstanding shares Dilution ratio Number of newly issued shares over pre-IPO outstanding shares Newly issued shares increase underwriter's valuation uncertainty (Yeoman, 2001) Institutional allocation Fraction of shares reserved to institutional investors by prospectus Institutional participation is necessary for an IPO to be successful (Aggarwal, 2000) Pre-IPO market return FTSE Italia MIB index return over 100 days prior the IPO Market returns capture investment opportunities, investor sentiment and other unknown dynamics (Lowry, 2003) Market momentum Number of IPOs in the Italian market during the 12 months before listing Favorable market sentiment makes trading activity more profitable for underwriters (Ellis, et al., 2000) Price revision Percentage difference between the offer price and the midpoint of the preliminary price range
Price revision should impound public and private information on investor demand gathered in the bookbuilding process (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989) Claw-back to retail Fraction of shares shifted from institutional to retail investors after the initial allocation, as percentage of total number of offered shares
Balance of cold demand of informed institutional investors with hot demand of non-informed retail investors (Bertoni, et al., 2008) Underpricing Percentage difference between first day official price and offer price Spread and underpricing can be complementary (Kim, et al., 2010) 
UNDERWRITER
Foreign underwriter Dummy for non-Italian lead underwriters US banks underwriting European IPOs are more costly (Torstila, 2001) Underwriter reputation Amount of capital raised by the underwriter over the total capital raised in the sample (scaled to 1 = 'national champion' Mediobanca)
Reputable banks charge higher fees and provide higher quality services (Fang, 2005) Syndicate size Number of members of the underwriting syndicate Syndicate size is important for the IPO risk sharing (Torstila, 2001 )
UNDERWRITER OPTIONS
Greenshoe dummy (volume) Dummy equal to 1 in case the underwriter allocates more shares than made available by the issuer (Fraction of greenshoe of offer volume actually exercised)
Control for short covering in the decision (intensity) to provide aftermarket support Overallotment dummy (volume) Dummy equal to 1 in case the underwriter allocates more shares than made available by the issuer (Amount of shares over-allocated, as percentage of offer volume)
Control for short covering in the decision (intensity) to provide aftermarket support Naked short dummy (volume) Dummy equal to 1 in case the underwriter overallocates more than 15% of the offer volume (Fraction of over-allocated shares exceeding the 15% threshold)
Control for short covering in the decision (intensity) to provide aftermarket support
